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FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K Solender*
T HE survey period has been noteworthy for an absence of activity in
two areas of importance to Texas family law. The Texas Legislature
did not meet, and as a result there were no changes in the Family Code.
Further, the United States Supreme Court did not engage in any findings
on the constitutionality of the various states' parent and child laws. This
hiatus in activity surely will be shortlived because the Sixty-seventh Texas
Legislature already is planning changes in family statutory law, and the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that it probably will take juris-
diction in a number of family law cases.' Texas courts, however, contin-
ued to interpret the Texas Family Code and to make decisions that affect
the structure of Texas family law. The number of family law disputes
coming to the courts has continued to rise, and the increase in the number
of authorized family district courts2 has created an increase in the number
of appeals.
I. STATUS
During the survey period the constitutionality of two University Inter-
scholastic League (UIL) eligibility requirements for participation in high
school athletic programs was considered. In Kite v. Marshall3 the federal
district court held unconstitutional the UIL's "summer camp rule," which
prohibits a student who attends a special athletic training camp from play-
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
I. See Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. 67, 66 L. Ed. 2d 19 (1980) (No. 79-6779) (probable
jurisdiction noted) (concerning charges for blood tests in paternity suits); In re Five Minor
Children, 407 A.2d 198 (Del. 1979) (concerning the constitutionally required standard in
cases involving termination of the parent-child relationship), prob. .uis, notedsub nom. Doe
v. Delaware, 100 S. Ct. 1336, 63 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1980); In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259
S.E.2d 336 (1979) (concerning the right of parents to have court appointed counsel when the
state is advocating the termination of parental rights), cert. granted sub nor. Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 70, 66 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1980). In addition, Justice
Powell, in vacating a stay order on an injunction that would continue the denial of free
public education to undocumented alien children, stated that "there is a reasonable
probability that this Court will grant certiorari or note probable jurisdiction." Certain
Named and Unnamed Non-Citizen Children v. Texas, 101 S. Ct. 12, 14, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1151,
1155 (1980). See also Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (Texas statute ap-
plied to deny public education to illegal aliens violates equal protection clause), a 'd, 628
F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1926a, § 1.02(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1980)
establishes additional family district courts that have jurisdiction to hear both domestic rela-
tions matters and special juvenile matters.
3. 494 F. Supp. 227, 234 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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ing in interscholastic basketball competition for a year thereafter.4 Citing
practically every United States Supreme Court case that deals with the
importance of the parent-child relationship,5 the court concluded that the
summer camp rule intrudes upon the family's right to personal privacy and
on the parents' right to decide the placement of their children. 6 Another
UIL regulation, the "one year rule," was upheld in Sullivan v. University
Interscholastic League . The one year rule provides that a student, after
moving from another district in which he has represented a high school in
basketball or football, is ineligible to participate in interscholastic basket-
ball or football for one calendar year in his new district. 8 The plaintiff in
Sullivan had played basketball in Vermont prior to coming to Texas be-
cause of his father's employment transfer. The court rejected the plaintiff's
contention that this rule violates the Constitution in that it infringes on the
right of interstate travel.9 Rather, the court found that the rule had been
applied equally to everyone and that the purpose of the rule was not to
punish new residents of a state, but to discourage the recruiting of high
school athletes.' 0 In addition, the court pointed out that the rule did not
preclude the plaintiff from playing basketball; he merely could not play in
varsity competition with other UIL teams during the one-year period."l
Galveston Independent School District v. Boothe 12 is a most unusual deci-
sion in that it sustains a trial court's injunction against the expulsion of a
high school student.' 3 The student had been expelled for possessing one-
fourteenth of an ounce of marijuana while sitting in an automobile parked
on a street adjacent to the school. The court of civil appeals found that the
rules on which the expulsion was based did not fairly apprise the student
of the type of prohibited conduct because, although the rules were clear
that expulsion could result from possession of marijuana "on campus,"
they were not clear that "on campus" included adjacent streets."4 The
court based its decision solely on the vagueness of the school's regulations,
which it found violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and did not rely on other constitutional grounds.' 5 The court did
not say that the school could not discipline its students; in fact it found
error because the school used expulsion prior to attempting other means of
4. Id. at 229.
5. Id. at 230-33; e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6. 494 F. Supp. at 234.
7. 599 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ granted).
8. Id. at 862.
9. Id at 865.
10. Id. In special situations, such as those involving the handicapped, the one-year rule
may be enjoined. See Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
11. 599 S.W.2d at 865.
12. 590 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
13. Id at 558.
14. Id. at 557.
15. Id
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correction.16 The court found that expulsion is a penalty that can be used
only if all rules and regulations are carefully followed, 17 thus implying that
the deprivation of an opportunity for education is a harsh remedy that
should be used carefully.' 8
The parental liability provisions of the Texas Family Code 19 were inter-
preted in Buie v. Longspaugh20 to mean that a parent's liability for his
child's actions is limited to $5,000 per act and not to mean that the ceiling
for a number of consecutive acts is $5,000.21 In Go International, Inc. v.
Lewis22 the Texas Wrongful Death Act 23 was interpreted to exclude
adopted children from being among the class of persons that can recover
under the act for the death of a natural parent. Lewis concerned a cause of
action by the natural children of a couple who had been negligently killed.
Because the children's aunt had adopted them prior to the accident, the
court held that, under the Wrongful Death Act, they were no longer chil-
dren of the deceased couple.24 This interpretation is in conformity with
case law interpreting the workers' compensation statute. 25
The courts have not yet decided whether parents can receive damages
for their own suffering in connection with the negligent death of a child.
Although the, issue was presented in Bedgood v. Madalin,26 the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case without deciding whether
a parent who is a bystander to the death of his child has a cause of action
in his own right, in addition to a wrongful death action.27
Parentage, which establishes ancestry as well as medical history and
support rights, is probably the most important information a child can
have. Usually a child can easily determine the identity of his mother, but
the determination of the identity of his father may be difficult. A mother's
16. Id. at 556.
17. Id.
18. Unlike expulsion, less harsh disciplinary actions have been allowed by the courts
with fewer procedural safeguards. See Pasadena Independent School Dist. v. Emmons, 586
S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ dism'd). In Emmons the court
denied a stay during the pendency of an appeal of a disciplinary order that assigned the
student to the school's guidance center for a maximum of six days. [d at 153. The denial
was based on the ground that no substantial and irreparable injury would occur from the
enforcement of the order. Id.
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-.03 (Vernon 1975).
20. 598 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
21. Id. at 676. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon 1975) provides that "[riecovery
for damage caused by wilful and malicious conduct is limited to actual damages, not to
exceed $5,000."
22. 601 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
23. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1952). The Act provides that
"[a]ctions for damage arising from death shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of and
may be brought by the surviving husband, wife, children, and parents of the person whose
death has been caused."
24. 601 S.W.2d at 498-99.
25. Id at 499. See also Griffith v. Christian, 564 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1978, no writ) (children adopted by stepfather prior to father's death were not "minor chil-
dren" under the statute; relying on Patton v. Shamburger, 431 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1968)).
26. 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1980).
27. Id. at 775-76.
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past or current marriage to a man does not necessarily establish his father-
hood in relation to a particular child, although marriage at the time of
conception raises an almost irrebutable presumption of legitimacy.28 Be-
cause accuracy in determining paternity is important, the Texas Legisla-
ture has established procedures for making this determination. 29 The
procedures, which rely on blood tests as well as the testimony of the par-
ties, should make it easier for any child to resolve questions concerning the
identity of his father.30 Unfortunately, the legislature included in the pro-
vision for establishing the identity of a father a one-year statute of limita-
tions, which runs from the child's date of birth.3' The courts have
interpreted this statute of limitations to apply to everyone, including the
child, and have not permitted any tolling of the statute during the child's
minority.32 In Texas Department of Human Resources v. Chapman33 the
court, in a poorly reasoned opinion, found the limitation constitutional on
the basis that a child's claim to support was not totally barred. 34 Other
Texas courts are now following the Chapman opinion. 35 No Texas court
has considered other claims relating to parental identity, such as genetic
heritage, which also are barred after the statute has run due to the lack of a
mechanism for otherwise establishing parental identity. The fact that
there is no similar statute of limitation in connection with voluntary legiti-
mation by the father might also raise some interesting equal protection
questions. 36
When an action to establish paternity is brought by or on behalf of a
child born prior to September 1, 1975, the effective date of the paternity
statute, courts will not apply the legitimation statute retroactively. 37 In-
28. See D.W.L. v. M.J.B.C., 601 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1980, writ refd n.r.e.), in which the mother who had been married at the time of conception
was able to overcome the presumption of legitimacy by proving nonaccess by her husband
and thus was entitled to establish, through blood tests in a paternity suit, the identity of the
biological father. But see Barcelo v. Barcelo, 603 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd), in which the presumption was not rebutted despite the fact
that the father received a vasectomy prior to conception. See also Brazier v. Brazier, 597
S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ) (mother unable to overcome pre-
sumption of legitimacy, but terminated father's parental rights based on nonsupport).
29. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 13.01-.06 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
30. See Chumley v. Hall, 601 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (for-
mer husband found to be biological father on basis of access and blood tests); Lewis v.
Johnson, 590 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 114th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (possible
paternity established on basis of blood tests conducted by one expert, but after trial on the
merits the weight of the evidence showed otherwise).
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
32. See Williams v. Luckey, 599 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ
refd n.r.e.) (holding that it was the intent of the legislature to prevent any tolling of this
statute).
33. 570 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Id. at 48-50.
35. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189, 192
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
36. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.21(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides that "[a] suit
under this section [for voluntary legitimation] may be instituted at any time."
37. Wynn v. Wynn, 587 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no
writ).
[Vol. 35
FAMILY LAW PARENT AND CHILD
stead, the courts have held uniformly that the child has a common law
right to establish paternity 38 and that the usual four-year statute of limita-
tions applies. 39 Although this statute runs from the child's date of birth, it
can be tolled during minority,40 and one court has held further that even a
delay of nine years in bringing the suit will not invoke the doctrine of
laches.4 1
In addition to the lack of a time limitation on voluntary legitimation,
there is also no requirement of blood tests. In Shockome v. Hernandez
42
the father petitioned not only for legitimation, but also to be named man-
aging conservator of the child. The natural mother opposed him and
moved to compel blood tests. The trial court overruled the motion and
after a trial on the merits found that it would be in the best interests of the
child to grant the father's petitions.43 The appellate court approved the
trial court's findings and pointed out that the use of blood tests in legitima-
tion proceedings is discretionary and that the trial court had not abused its
discretion in denying the tests because blood tests are time consuming and
nonpaternity might have been established through other evidence. 44 Vol-
untary legitimation, when opposed by the mother, is not automatically
granted on a finding that a person is a biological father; it must also be
found to be in the child's best interests.4 5 Moreover, in Doe v. Roe 46 the
court of civil appeals held that a person alleging himself to be the biologi-
cal father of a legitimate child is not a "party affected" 47 by a divorce
decree that establishes the conservatorship rights of the legal parents, and
that he cannot move to modify the decree so as to become a conservator
himself.48 This decision is certainly in accord with public policy concern-
38. Id
39. See Texas Dep't of Human Resources v. Delley, 581 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). When no limitation is otherwise prescribed, TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958) provides that the action "shall be brought within four
years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued and not afterward."
40. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
41. Prejean v. Prejean, 592 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
42. 587 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
43. Id at 537.
44. Id
45. See In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980); In re C-D-V-, 589 S.W.2d
543, 546 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ). The importance of legitimation to the
children concerned was discussed by the court in Sims v. Sims, 589 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ), to explain why an appeal was heard and dismissed, even
though it could have been dismissed for want of prosecution without being heard. Although
the mother in Sims had opposed legitimation, the jury found that legitimation was in the
best interests of the children. Id. at 866. The mother appealed, but failed to file any briefs
or appear for the hearing. Nevertheless, the appellate court found that because the guardian
ad litem had not pursued the appeal in the minors' behalf, he must have believed that by
virtue of their legitimation they had "secured an advantage ... [or not] suffered a detri-
ment." Id at 867.
46. 600 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
47. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(p (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides that only a
"party affected" by a conservatorship decree may move to modify the decree.
48. 600 S.W.2d at 379-80. But ef. Watts v. Watts, 573 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1978, no writ) (grandparent may be a "person affected").
1981]
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ing the presumption of the legitimacy of children born during marriage49
and with the doctrine of res judicata. 50
Sometimes paternity cannot be established because of a lack of jurisdic-
tion. In In re D.N.S. 51 a paternity suit, the court held that the trial court
did not have personal jurisdiction over the alleged father, a Minnesota res-
ident, under the Family Code long-arm statute5 2 because the father had
never been in Texas. 53 The mother alleged that she and the child were in
Texas as a result of the putative father's acts, directives, or approval. Al-
though the mother's allegations tracked the language of the long-arm stat-
ute, the court held that this type of contact with Texas was constitutionally
insufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction over the alleged father. 54 Lack
of jurisdiction is yet another example of the problems caused by the one-
year statute of limitations in paternity suits. 55 The man who was alleged to
be the father in this suit could come to Texas next year and under present
law there would be no way to establish paternity.
Status is very important in inheritance matters, and cases concerning
equitable adoptions continue to arise despite the elaborate adoption provi-
sions in the Family Code.56 Moore v. Douglas57 held that the heir in ques-
tion was the adopted daughter of a deceased couple in that she had been
adopted by estoppel. 58 The adopted daughter had lived with the deceased
couple since she was three, had been given the couple's last name, and had
taken care of them in their last illnesses. These factors, the court held,
constituted sufficient evidence to find that there had been an implied
agreement on the part of the deceased to adopt the plaintiff and that the
adopted daughter had relied on the agreement. 59 In another case relating
to status, the court dismissed a suit to enjoin an abortion brought on behalf
of an unborn child. 60 The appellant had sought to bring the suit as next
friend of the minor. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Roe v. Wade,61 that an unborn child is not a person, the Texas court
held that the appellant had no standing, because she was not representing
a real party in interest.62
49. Sims v. Sims, 589 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
50. See Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw.
L.J. 159, 170 (1980).
51. 592 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
53. 592 S.W.2d at 36-37.
54. Id at 37; see Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
55. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
56. Id §§ 16.01-.12 (Vernon 1975).
57. 589 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
58. Id. at 865. Adoption by estoppel occurs when the promises, acts, and conduct of the
deceased equitably require that those claiming under and through him be estopped from
asserting that a child was not legally adopted by the deceased. See Heien v. Crabtree, 369
S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963).
59. 589 S.W.2d at 865.
60. Brady v. Doe, 598 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ
ref'd n.re.).
61. 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
62. 598 S.W.2d at 339.
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II. CONSERVATORSHIP
The saga of Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises and the state continues and
will probably continue for several more years before the problems are re-
solved. 63 At issue is the constitutionality of the application of the Texas
Child Care Licensing Act 64 to religious child care centers. The courts ear-
lier had found the Act constitutional, 65 and the controversy now centers on
enforcement. The federal courts, based on the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Younger v. Harris66 that a federal court should abstain
from interfering in state matters so long as there is an opportunity for the
state to resolve the issue,67 have refused to act. 68 In the most recent skir-
mish the state brought what it conceived to be a motion for contempt; the
appellate court, however, held that it was not a nonappealable contempt
motion, but neither was it held to be a final judgment, and therefore the
appeal was dismissed.69 The court pointed out that as far as any civil pen-
alties for violation of the act were concerned, because there was no proof
that the children in the home were under the age of eighteen, there was no
proof of a violation.70
The right to have custody of one's children is a personal right and can-
not be divested without personal jurisdiction. 7' Jurisdiction alone does not
mean that a court should, in every instance, decide questions of custody.
Because the best interests of the children are the main concern of the court,
the court can choose to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction when it is
shown that another court would be in a better position to make the deter-
mination. In Cossey v. Cossey72 the parties met all the requirements for
jurisdiction by the Texas court, but because the children had been in
school in Louisiana for two years and the original family home was in
Louisiana, the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to refuse to assert jurisdiction. 73 In Comisky v. Comisky74 a court
63. See Solender, Family Law.- Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw.
L.J. 155, 164 (1979).
64. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-.076 (Vernon 1980). Section 42.075 pro-
vides for civil penalties to any person who:
(1) threatens serious harm to a child in a facility by violating a provision of
this chapter or a department rule or standard;
(2) violates a provision of this chapter or a department rule or standard
three or more times within a 12-month period; or
(3) places a public advertisement for an unlicensed facility.
65. See Oxford v. Hill, 558 S.W.2d 557, 559. (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd).
66. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
67. Id at 54.
68. See Corpus Christi Peoples' Baptist Church, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Human Re-
sources, 481 F. Supp. 1101, 1107-11 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
69. Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 598 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
70. Id at 701-02. A home is subject to the provisions of the Child Care Licensing Act
only if it provides "care, training, education, custody, treatment or supervision" to a child
who is under 18 years of age. TEX. HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.002(1), (3) (Vernon
1980).
71. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1953).
72. 602 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
73. Id at 596.
74. 597 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
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assumed jurisdiction in a divorce and conservatorship suit when only the
husband was before the court and his connection with Texas was through
military service. 75 The wife and children had never been in the state, but
because the wife was served and filed no answer, the trial court granted the
divorce and gave the husband conservatorship in a default judgment. 76
The wife then filed for a writ of error, which the appellate court found
constituted a general appearance. 77 The court affirmed the divorce, and
because the court now had personal jurisdiction, reversed and remanded
as to conservatorship. 78 Under these circumstances the court might have
instructed the trial court to refrain from attempting to resolve the issue of
conservatorship in that the children were not in Texas and certainly were
not brought before the court by their mother's "general appearance."
Grandparents may wish to be appointed managing conservators when
their grandchildren become orphans, and a problem arises when both sets
of grandparents petition to be so named. Because a conservatorship con-
test often occurs in relation to the settlement of an estate, it generally is
brought as a guardianship application under the Probate Code. 79 The Pro-
bate Code guardianship provisions, however, are more concerned with
property than with people and do not focus as strongly on the best interests
of the child as do the provisions of the Family Code. In Chapa v. Her-
nandez,80 however, the trial court and jury were able to surmount this dif-
ficulty and make findings based on the best interests of the child. The
findings were sustained by the appellate court.81 A misreading of the
Family Code can also cause problems for grandparents, as was the case in
In re K.D.R. 82 The trial court rendered judgment on an instructed verdict
against the grandparents on the basis that a person who is not a parent
cannot be appointed managing conservator without a termination of the
parent-child relationship.83 The appellate court correctly found this to be
a misreading of the law and pointed out that a proceeding for appointment
of a managing conservator may be conducted between private parties
without any state involvement. 84 The case was reversed and remanded. 85
When a proper bill of review is brought in connection with divorce and
conservatorship, a default judgment will be set aside. In Vinklarek v. Fin-
75. Id. at 8. Military personnel who have been stationed in Texas for six months are
considered Texas domiciliaries for the purpose of bringing suit for divorce. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.23 (Vernon 1975).
76. 597 S.W.2d at 7.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id.
79. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 108-127A (Vernon 1980).
80. 587 S.W.2d 778, 780-81 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
81. Id at 781.
82. 590 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
83. Id. at 178.
84. Id at 179. See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.01, .07 (Vernon 1975 & Supp.
1980-1981) (court has discretion to appoint managing conservator based upon best interests
of child).
85. 590 S.W.2d at 179.
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klarek86 the appellate court, because of the remarriage of both parties,
reversed the trial court's summary judgment denying the bill.87 The court
pointed out that the divorce was final because neither party could com-
plain of the other's remarrying, but because the appellant had not other-
wise accepted the fruits of the original judgment, the court held that the
conservatorship and property issues could be relitigated.88
Winning by default is one method of assuring custody, and another is
thought to be the "home court advantage," a strategy apparent in In re
Marriage of Allen. 89 The wife in Allen had left her husband and moved
with her children to her parents' home in a neighboring county. As soon
as possible, but before she could comply with the residence requirements
for a divorce, 90 she filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 9'
Four days later the husband filed suit for divorce in the county of his resi-
dence, which was also the marital domicile. He then went to the wife's
court and moved that her case be moved to his court so that all the matters
would be consolidated in one suit. Under the Family Code such a transfer
is mandatory when there is a divorce suit pending elsewhere.92 Prior to the
hearing on the motion to transfer, the wife amended her parent-child rela-
tionship suit into a divorce suit, although she admitted that she had not yet
met the residence requirements. She then filed a motion in the husband's
court to abate the divorce action. Neither court granted either transfer
motion, and both courts ultimately entered final judgments of divorce. 93
No appeal was taken from the wife's judgment, but the wife appealed the
husband's judgment. The appellate court found that when the husband
filed his suit for divorce, the court in which he filed obtained dominant
jurisdiction over the suit and the wife's court was immediately deprived of
jurisdiction of everything except the motion to transfer, which, under the
circumstances, was a ministerial act.94 The court ruled that the wife's at-
tempt to change her parent-child relationship suit to a divorce suit when
she could not comply with the residency requirements was unsuccessful,
because such an action would constitute forum shopping.95 If the county
residency requirements for divorce are to have any meaning, this is the
right result; otherwise parties can establish jurisdiction for divorce merely
by moving their children from one county to another.
After a hearing on the merits in a divorce conservatorship suit, the court
86. 596 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1980, no writ).
87. Id. at 200.
88. Id. at 199-200.
89. 593 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975) provides: "No suit for divorce may be
maintained unless at the time suit is filed the petitioner or the respondent has been . . . a
resident of the county in which the suit is filed for thepreceding ninety-day period." (Empha-
sis added.)
91. Id § 11.04(a) provides: "[A] suit affecting the parent-child relationship shall be
brought in the county where the child resides." (Emphasis added.)
92. Id § 3.55(c).
93. 593 S.W.2d at 136.
94. Id at 137-38.
95. Id. at 137 n.4.
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may award managing conservatorship to either parent 96 or to grandpar-
ents, 97 so long as the decision is in the child's best interest. In addition to
deciding the question of conservatorship, the court can enjoin the manag-
ing conservator from taking the child out of the state without the written
permission of the court,98 or require an out-of-state possessory conservator
to post bond before allowing the out-of-state visit.99 To reach its conclu-
sions concerning conservatorship, the court may rely on expert witnesses,
and it is not necessarily an abuse of discretion to find that a court investi-
gator is such an expert. I°° A court should not designate a temporary man-
aging conservator after a final divorce decree has been rendered because
temporary orders are unnecessary under the continuing jurisdiction provi-
sions of the Family Code. I0 The Texas Supreme Court will issue a writ of
mandamus to facilitate a transfer when a transfer is denied by this designa-
tion. 102
The Texas Supreme Court also continues to enforce by mandamus the
habeas corpus provisions of the Family Code 0 3 when the lower courts fail
to follow the law,' °4 but some remedy may have to be devised for a case
like Zeissig P. Zeissig.105 In that case the trial court granted a writ of
habeas corpus for possession of three children to their mother, a Chilean
domiciliary, without giving the respondent father an opportunity to appear
or be heard. The writ was served and the children were brought to court,
and on the same day another hearing was held, again without the respon-
dent. The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the basis that a writ of
habeas corpus is not appealable even if it is obtained without due pro-
96. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 592 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no
writ) (conservatorship granted to father and appeal denied; mother first raised the issue of
no conference with child over 12 years of age at time of motion for new trial; raising issue at
that time was too late); Altamirano v. Altamirano, 591 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, no writ) (managing conservatorship granted to father); Baker v. Baker, 588
S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (conservatorship granted to
mother and appeal dismissed because father had absconded from state with the child and
continued to hold the child).
97. See Camp v. Camp, 591 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ).
98. See Brock v. Brock, 586 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, no writ) (father
named managing conservator of older children and mother named managing conservator of
youngest, subject to an injunction on removing child from the state). See also Wash v.
Menn, 588 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ dism'd) (mother, after court
hearing, properly was granted permission to remove child from the state).
99. In re Marriage of Miller, 600 S.W.2d 386, 388-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980,
no writ).
100. Bell v. Bell, 593 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no
writ).
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "[Wihen a
court acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, that court retains
continuing jurisdiction of all matters provided for under this subtitle in connection with the
child ....
102. See Brines v. Mcllhaney, 596 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. 1980). See also Brad v. Baker, 591
S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1980) (trial court ordered to grant motion to transfer the proceedings to the
county of the children's residence).
103. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.10 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
104. See Forbes v. Wettman, 598 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. 1980); Gray v. Rankin, 594 S.W.2d
409 (Tex. 1980); Elliott v. Bradshaw, 587 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1978).
105. 600 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1980, no writ).
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cess.' 0 6 The court held that Gray v. Rankin 107 is dispositive of the issue of
jurisdiction. 108
A successful motion to modify managing conservatorship must be based
on a substantial change in circumstance as well as on the best interests of
the child.'09 If no change in circumstance is proven, the motion will be
denied. 10 A consent judgment based on an agreement to modify is not
proper when one of the parties has repudiated the agreement prior to the
rendition of the judgment."' The change will not be sustained unless
there is other evidence to support the judgment." 12
A/ston v. Rains 113 concerns the problem of two different custody decrees
granted by two different states. The first decree was in Texas, granting a
divorce and conservatorship to the mother, who is blind. The second was
in Arkansas with all parties before the court, and the court appointed the
maternal grandparents permanent guardians of the child. When the child
was brought to Texas for a visit, pursuant to the Arkansas decree, the
mother obtained a writ of habeas corpus. At the hearing on the writ the
trial court refused to recognize the Arkansas decree and ordered that the
mother maintain custody based on the earlier Texas decree.' 14 The writ
was appealed, and the appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court
should have granted full faith and credit to the Arkansas decree.,' 5 This
case arose before Gray v. Rankin," 6 and the appeal should have been dis-
missed. Under present Texas law the merits of conservatorship should not
have been tested by way of a writ of habeas corpus, but rather through a
hearing on modification of the Arkansas decree. This would have necessi-
tated a showing of a change in circumstances of the maternal grandparents
106. Id at 356-57.
107. 594 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1980). In Gray the Texas Supreme Court held that the courts
of civil appeals do not have jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases concerning the conservator-
ship of children. Id at 409. The Family Code does not list the granting or denying of
habeas corpus among those orders from which an appeal may be taken. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 11.19(b)(2) (Vernon 1975).
108. 600 S.W.2d at 357.
109. See Barron v. Bastow, 601 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd)
(managing conservatorship changed from father to mother); Thibodeaux v. Forse, 592
S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.) (court approved changing
managing conservatorship from mother to father because the father had been the de facto
managing conservator and the children had been doing well in his home). See also T.A.B. v.
W.L.B., 598 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), writ refd n.r.e., per curiam, 606 S.W.2d
695 (Tex. 1980). In refusing the writ in T,4B. v. WL.B. the supreme court commented that
although there was no reversible error in changing the managing conservatorship from the
father to the mother, it did not approve the language of the court of civil appeals in stating
that § 11.13(b) of the Family Code, on jury verdicts, prohibits an appellate court from con-
sidering properly raised no evidence points. 606 S.W.2d 695, 695 (Tex. 1980).
110. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 601 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Caples v. Goodwin, 601 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ).
111. Vineyard v. Vineyard, 597 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
112. Id
113. 589 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ).
114. Id. at 482.
115. Id. at 486.
116. 594 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1980); see note 107 supra.
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such that the best interests of the child would be served by granting cus-
tody to the mother. The qualifications of the mother should not have been
the sole issue in such a dispute.
At the time of divorce the rights of managing and possessory conserva-
tors are established, but as the children grow older their needs may change
and this can necessitate a modification in the access rights of the parties.
In Little v. Little" 7 the court approved the modification of the rights of the
possessory conservator based on a showing that the child needed a longer
period in one place in order to participate in various sports programs." 8
Oliver v. Boutwell119 involved not a change in age, but a change in loca-
tion, and probably should also have resulted in some modification of the
possessory conservator's rights. The issue never was litigated because the
trial court sustained the wife's special appearance and dismissed the case.
The couple had been divorced in 1975, and the wife had moved to Missis-
sippi in 1977. With no other courts involved, the husband moved for a
modification in 1978 in the original court, which dismissed the case.120
The court of appeals reversed and remanded based on the long-arm stat-
ute121 rather than on the obvious fact that the trial court was the court of
continuing jurisdiction and that the purpose of the suit was merely to mod-
ify an existing decree.122
Grandparents are accorded some right to access under the provisions of
the Texas Family Code. 123 In In re L.L.K 124 the court dismissed the peti-
tion of the grandparents to be appointed possessory conservators when no
managing conservator had been appointed. 25 This holding followed the
decision in Barrientos v. Garza,126 which had held that in order to main-
tain suit there must be or have been some litigation concerning the parent-
child relationship. Mere change in terminology is not dispositive of grand-
parents' rights, so the fact that a mother had been granted custody in a
divorce entered prior to the enactment of the Family Code was held to be
the same as appointment as managing conservator, and the grandparent
could maintain a suit for access.127 The right to maintain a suit, however,
does not guarantee success, and in the particular case the appellate court
held that the jury finding that it would be in the best interests of the child
117. 590 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
118. Id at 623-24.
119. 601 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
120. Id at 394.
121. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
122. 601 S.W.2d at 398.
123. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides that "[tihe
court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the maternal or paternal grandparents
of the child and issue any necessary orders to enforce said decree."
124. 591 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ).
125. Id at 629.
126. 559 S.W.2d 399, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ). See also Solender,
supra note 63, at 167 (citing Barrientos for the proposition that the statutory provisions on
the access of grandparents limit rather than expand the court's power).
127. Dolman v. Dolman, 586 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ
dism'd).
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to grant the grandparent access was so contrary to the weight of the evi-
dence as to be manifestly unjust.' 28 Markman v. Lachman 129 was a suit
brought by a father against his minor son's grandparents, natural mother,
and stepfather. Apparently, the mother had remarried and removed the
child from Texas. She concealed her whereabouts, and the father was un-
able to visit his child. Most of the parties were not amenable to service,
and the maternal grandparents who were, were not shown to have entered
into a conspiracy to deprive the father of the knowledge of their grandson's
whereabouts. Accordingly, the trial court directed a verdict in their favor,
and the appellate court affirmed. 130 This case and Baker v. Baker'3'
demonstrate that although the courts may adjudicate parental rights, the
rights become unenforceable if the parents decide to conceal the children's
whereabouts. The recently enacted Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 1980132 may help solve the problem.
III. SUPPORT
The Texas Family Code provides that child support is the obligation of
both parents. 133 Accordingly, when the father is named as managing con-
servator, the mother should be required to pay her fair share.134 The prob-
lem, however, usually is not that of the mother paying a fair share, but
rather that of the father, and courts in their original divorce decrees are
attempting to be certain that fathers are given financial responsibility for
their children. In two recent cases courts refused to hold that a father's
lack of income would excuse his child support obligation when the father
would have had greater earning power if he had chosen to exercise it. 135 A
father's being on a veteran's pension and social security was also found to
be an insufficient excuse for not contributing to the support of his children
because "[t]he duty of a parent to support a child is not limited to current
earnings but extends to his financial ability to pay from any and all sources
that might be available."' 136
One appellate court, however, decided that the trial court's finding on
128. Id at 610.
129. 602 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
130. Id. at 353.
131. 588 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); see note 96 supra.
132. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3566.
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides: "[Elach parent
has the duty to support his or her minor child. . . [and a] parent who fails to discharge the
duty of support is liable to any person who provides necessaries to those to whom support is
owed."
134. Grandinetti v. Grandinetti, 600 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ).
135. See In re Marriage of Miller, 600 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no
writ) (father presently employed in a used auto parts store, but is a certified welder and has
earned more than $1,000 a month); Cordell v. Cordell, 592 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, no writ) (father who alleged he had no income because he was a full-time
dental school student held to be capable of part-time employment to pay $150 per month
child support and should be required to pay part of ad litem fee).
136. Musick v. Musick, 590 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
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child support was excessive and required a remittitur of the overage. 37
The court based its holding on the "record as a whole"'138 and gave no
specific reason for finding the amount excessive, even though the reformed
decree would give the mother and child a smaller total monthly income,
including her salary, than the father would keep for himself.1
39
The courts also are recognizing that child support can be given in non-
monetary services as well as through financial support so that the mone-
tary contributions need not be equal. In Krempp v. Krempp 140 this was the
basis for upholding an award of $1,000 a month in child support from the
father, although the managing conservator mother had sizeable separate
assets. Requiring as a part of the support obligation the payment of rea-
sonable medical expenses in addition to a periodic or lump-sum payment
also can be proper. 14 1 The medical payments are unenforceable by con-
tempt, however, because they are not a sum certain, but they are enforcea-
ble as a matter of contract or as a debt. 142 Some forms of uncertainty are
too great to support a judgment, and one appellate court reversed a trial
court's award of support and conservatorship for an unborn child, holding
that judgments should be based upon facts existing at the time of rendi-
tion. 143
When a court, at the time of divorce, renders its decree dividing the
property and setting child support, it expects that the parties will carry out
the provisions of the decree. The courts are often wrong in this expecta-
tion as witnessed by the more than fifteen cases decided during the survey
period involving habeas corpus because of nonsupport allegations.' n  Al-
though courts cannot predict when a particular parent will default, Colley
v. Co/f1ey145 permitted an expectation of default to be taken into considera-
tion by a trial court in the division of community property. There the trial
court was sustained in its uneven division of the community property be-
cause it had concluded that there was "no reasonable expectation that ap-
pellant [father] would be faithful in his financial responsibilities to his
child and that appellee [mother] must be prepared financially, in that
137. Fleming v. Fleming, 595 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, writ
dism'd).
138. Id
139. See Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Differ-
ence?, 14 FAM. L.Q. 141, 174 (1980) (substantiating that California courts are also guilty of
creating this disparity between post-divorce income of husband and wife).
140. 590 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, no writ). The father in Krempp
had asserted that the $ 1,000 per month child support would relieve the wife of any financial
responsibility for the child, thus violating TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp.
1980-1981) and TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (the equal rights amendment).
141. See Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
no writ). Appellant argued that only support payments that are "lump-sum" or "periodic"
are allowed by TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975), and that reasonable medi-
cal expenses are not lump-sum or periodic. 601 S.W.2d at 93.
142. Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980,
no writ); Exparte Shelton, 582 S.W.2d 637, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
143. Tully v. Tully, 595 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
144. See notes 156-85 infra and accompanying text.
145. 597 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
[Vol. 35
FAMILY LAW PARENT AND CHILD
event, to provide and care for the child."' 146 The father had, apparently,
never seen the child and had not paid any of the medical and hospital
expenses in connection with its birth. At trial he said that he had had a
change of heart and was going to take an interest in the child. The appel-
late court agreed that the trial court did not have to believe the father. 147
A similar lack of belief in the promises of the father probably explains the
trial court's property divison in Campbell v. Campbell. 148 In Campbell the
trial court made an unequal division of the couple's separate property in
order to provide for the children, and this was sustained by the appellate
court. 14 9 The Texas Supreme Court at first appeared to reverse, 50 but
then withdrew its opinon and set aside all the judgments, including those
of the appellate and trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court. ' 5 '
The supreme court explained that there had been a settlement between the
parties and so the matter was moot.' 5 2
Young v. Young'53 was another case wherein the trial court made an
unequal division of the property in order to provide for a child born of the
marriage. The appellate court's reversal stated that the fact that an adult
disabled son was residing with and dependent on the wife could not be
considered in the property division. 154 The Texas Supreme Court in re-
versing held that the Family Code does permit consideration of the rights
of any children, including adult children, in a division of the estate of the
parties. 15-
A parent who is in arrears on his child support obligations may be found
in contempt and incarcerated. To be valid, a contempt order should be
carefully tailored to the particular situation, and reliance on a printed form
with blanks to be filled in can result in a finding that the commitment
order is void for lack of specificity.' 56 Oral contempt orders may be even
less reliable than a printed form. In Exparle Perry 157 the court found an
146. Id. at 32.
147. Id
148. 586 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979), vacated, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84
(Nov. 22, 1980).
149. 586 S.W.2d at 170.
150. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 391, 393 (June 4, 1980).
151. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 84, 84 (Nov. 22, 1980).
152. Id.
153. 594 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), rev'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 119 (Dec. 13,
1980).
154. 594 S.W.2d at 545.
155. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 119, 121-22 (Dec. 13, 1980); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63
(Vernon 1975).
156. Exparte Roy, 595 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Exparte
Jenkins, 593 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). See also Fowler v.
Stone, 600 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (divorce decree
did not grant wife judgment against husband that she could execute against his assets; court
found him in contempt for failure to pay child support).
157. 600 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ). But see Exparte
Rine, 603 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ) (if an oral order is reduced
to writing the same day, it is enforceable). See also Exparte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 256
(Tex. 1980) (order invalid when there was an 80-day delay between oral order and its reduc-
tion to writing).
1981]
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
oral order to be void, even though it had been reduced to writing seven
days later.158 A contempt order also becomes invalid and unenforceable
when a judgment upon which the order is based is reversed by an appellate
court. 159 Additionally, due process requires at a minimum that the relator
be notified of his show cause hearing on a contempt motion, and failure to
do so makes the contempt order void. 160 A contempt order based on a
decree providing for support for children over eighteen is void as it would
be imprisonment for a debt contrary to the Texas Constitution. 16 1 This
results from the Family Code in that the Code does not require that chil-
dren over the age of eighteen be supported.162 Contempt, therefore, is not
an appropriate remedy to enforce support for a child aged nineteen who is
attending college. 163 Attorney's fees and court costs in connection with
child support orders are enforceable by contempt 164 because they are a
part of the cost of obtaining support. This is true despite the holding to the
contrary in Ex parte Provost. 16 5
In Exparte Payne 166 the court granted a writ of habeas corpus because a
father's imprisonment constituted double jeopardy. 167 The father had
paid $1,000 in order to purge himself; when the court found that he still
owed $4,257, however, it reincarcerated him even though he had not com-
mitted any new act of contempt. 168 The appellate court found that the
father's incarceration violated the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.169 The opinion, however, is more interesting for its discus-
sion of the problem of the statute of limitation as it pertains to child sup-
port.170 At the moment it is not clear which of the Texas time limitations
applies to an action for child support. One line of cases holds that child
support actions are governed by the ten-year judgments statute. 17 The
158. 600 S.W.2d at 358.
159. Flowers v. Flowers, 589 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
160. Exparle Garza, 593 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ). See
also Exparte Jones, 602 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ) (if husband
receives notice and fails to appear allegedly because ex-wife said she was going to dismiss,
the writ will be denied).
161. In re Cobble, 592 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd); see TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 18, which provides: "No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt."
162. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975) provides: "The court may order
either or both parents to make periodic payments or a lump-sum payment, or both, for the
support of the child until he is 18 years of age... " But see id § 14.05(b) (court may order
payments after child reaches 18 years of age if child is mentally or physically disabled).
163. In re Cobble, 592 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ dism'd).
164. See Exparte Helms, 152 Tex. 480, 486-87, 259 S.W.2d 184, 188-89 (1953); Exparte
Rine, 603 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ); Exparte Roy, 595 S.W.2d
875, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Exparte McManus, 589 S.W.2d 790, 792
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
165. 598 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ).
166. 598 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
167. Id. at 316.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170. 598 S.W.2d at 318-19.
171. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978,
no writ) (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958)); Houtchens v. Mat-
thews, 557 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ dism'd).
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Texas Supreme Court has held that child support is not a debt,' 72 so the
four-year debt limitation statute 73 would not apply. The court in Payne
applied the catch-all limitation statute, 174 which is also four years, and
then considered whether the statute would be tolled because of the minor-
ity of the child, the true party in interest. 175 The court concluded that it
probably would not. 176 Because the duty of support is to the child, 177 this
author suggests that whatever limitation statute is found to be applicable,
it should be tolled during the minority of the child. There is also no reason
that laches or a collusive agreement by the payee, who is generally the
managing conservator of the child, should defeat the child's right to sup-
port. Although payment of back child support to a twenty-year-old will
not eradicate the years of poverty caused by the earlier failure to pay, it
should help the child overcome past deficiencies and may enable the child,
as an adult, to become better educated. 1
78
The problem of interpreting the powers of the transferee court, as a new
court of continuing jurisdiction, finally was resolved this year. 179 In Ex
parte Barnett '80 the Texas Supreme Court held that the transferee court as
the new and, after transfer of the cause of action, the only court of continu-
ing jurisdiction over all proceedings affecting the parent-child relationship
has the power "to hear and decide pending and new contempt proceedings
arising from the alleged failure to comply with orders of the transferring
district court ...regardless of whether all or some of the alleged con-
temptuous acts were committed before the transfer of the cause to the
transferee court."' 8' This holding was based on a finding that the Family
Code requires all proceedings relating to the welfare of a child be in one
court. 182 The court overruled all previous conflicting opinions. 183 The
continuing jurisdiction rule also would apply to other support remedies
such as reduction of unpaid arrearages to judgment. 84
Another unresolved question is the status of unpaid temporary child
support after the entry of the final divorce decree. In two cases Texas
courts held that if the final decree does not modify the temporary orders,
172. Smith v. Bramhall, 563 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex. 1978) (per curiam).
173. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
174. 598 S.W.2d at 319; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958).
175. 598 S.W.2d at 319; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
176. 598 S.W.2d at 319.
177. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981); see note 133 supra.
178. See Gibbs v. Giles, 607 P.2d 118 (Nev. 1980) (child as a third-party beneficiary had
a cause of action, and the statute of limitations was tolled during child's minority because
otherwise child would be sacrificed by inaction of parent).
179. See Solender, supra note 50, at 176-77.
180. 600 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. 1980).
181. Id at 255.
182. Id at 255-56; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.06(h) (Vernon 1975).
183. 600 S.W.2d at 255; see, e.g., Exparte Gonzalez, I ll Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635 (1922).
The Barnett court specifically disapproved Ex parte Chandler, 580 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1st Dist.] 1979, no writ). 600 S.W.2d at 255.
184. See, e.g., Chandler v. Mierendorf, 590 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1979, no writ).
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the past-due obligations are not nullified by the establishment of new and
different future payments. 185 Accordingly, the relator may be confined af-
ter the rendition of the final decree until he has paid the arrearage based
on the temporary orders.
In addition to using contempt, with its threat of incarceration, as a
means of collecting unpaid child support, the unpaid amount can be re-
duced to a judgment and the arrearages collected by levying execution on
whatever property the delinquent former spouse may have. 186 The remedy
is one of right and should be granted even though contempt is also re-
quested.1 87 Failure to name a payee in a child support order does not
prevent the managing conservator from obtaining a judgment; 188 but if the
original decree is ambiguous and no extrinsic evidence is offered by way of
explanation, a judgment should not be rendered. 189 The jurisdiction re-
quired to render a judgment may be obtained over a nonresident under the
Family Code long-arm statute when the nonresident has sufficient contacts
with Texas.' 90 In Crockett v. Crockett 19 1 the parties were married in
Texas, lived together in Texas for several years thereafter, and had chil-
dren who were born in and were currently residents of Texas, and whom
the respondent had visited in Texas. These facts provided sufficient con-
tacts with Texas to support jurisdiction over the respondent despite the fact
that the divorce had been obtained in Ohio and the respondent had been a
resident of Ohio since 1974.192 Although back child support is not a debt,
because it can be reduced to judgment, 193 the death of a party owing child
support arrearages does not prevent collection when there is an estate
against which judgment can be rendered. 194 If the beneficiary of a spend-
thrift trust 95 fails to pay his support obligations, the proceeds may be gar-
nished. 196
185. Exparte Davis, 597 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); Ex
parte Shaver, 597 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ). But see Exparte
Grothe, 581 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, no writ) (temporary orders su-
perseded by entry of divorce decree).
186. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Vernon 1975).
187. Frank v. Reese, 594 S.W.2d 119, 122-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979,
no writ); McPherson v. Townsend, 593 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ).
188. Bastow v. Barron, 603 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
189. Richey v. Bolerjack, 594 S.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
But see Freeman v. Williams, 596 S.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.) (court relied on similar language to determine that the intent of the parties
was unambiguous).
190. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
191. 589 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
192. Id. at 762.
193. Adair v. Martin, 595 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. 1980).
194. Id; see Smith v. Brumhall, 556 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977), writ refd
n.r.e. per curiam, 563 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1978).
195. A spendthrift trust is a trust "in which the beneficiary is prohibited from anticipat-
ing or assigning his interest in or income from the trust estate." Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d
235, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1952, writ refd n.r.e.). See also First Bank & Trust v.
Goss, 533 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
196. Myrick v. Moody Nat'l Bank, 590 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
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The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) 197 is
being used with greater frequency and success. Registration of valid for-
eign support orders should be almost a routine matter in that such factors
as requests for modification, 98 the present age of the child, 199 and even
language concerning alimony 200 may not be considered by the responding
court.20 ' Moreover, the validity of the foreign decree is irrelevant to a
URESA action because a father's duty of support is independent of a di-
vorce decree. 202 Also, a child's alleged illegitimacy is often rebutted by the
presumption that a child born of the marriage is legitimate and entitled to
support.203 Thus, a court should grant a continuance in a URESA action
only when the plaintiffs and the defendant's financial status and the cir-
cumstances of the child are questioned.2°4 When the defendant has had
insufficient contacts with Texas for the Texas courts to obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant, the plaintiff, in order to modify a foreign support de-
cree, can either file in the original foreign court or use the URESA. In
Bergdoll v. Whitley205 the Texas court held that although basic considera-
tions of fairness pointed to Tennessee as the forum for a suit to modify a
child support decree,206 the Texas plaintiff would not have to bring suit in
Tennessee because both Texas and Tennessee had enacted the URESA. 20 7
Because we are now in an era of double-digit inflation, the numerous
requests for upward modification of child support decrees are not surpris-
ing. Modification is granted provided there is sufficient evidence of a ma-
terial change of circumstances. 20 8 Evidence of change of circumstance can
be as disparate as a rise in the cost of school lunches, 20 9 the unsuitability of
a dwelling based on too few bedrooms for children of opposite sexes, 210 or
a curtailment in the use of a country club.211 Courts are taking judicial
197. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980-1981).
198. Littrell v. Littrell, 601 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
199. Ackerman v. Yanoscik, 601 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.]
1980, no writ).
200. Parker v. Parker, 593 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no
writ).
201. The procedure for registration of foreign support orders is delineated at TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 21.61-.66 (Vernon 1975).
202. Etchison v. Greathouse, 596 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1980, no writ).
203. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 12.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
204. See id. § 21.34 (Vernon 1975) (continuance should be granted only when "the plain-
tiff is absent from the responding state and the defendant presents evidence which consti-
tutes a defense").
205. 598 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
206. Id. at 935-36.
207. Id. at 936.
208. Williams v. Williams, 596 S.W.2d 245, 247-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1980, no writ) (reversing and remanding because modification was based on surmise
rather than on facts indicating a change in husband's income).
209. Moreland v. Moreland, 589 S.W.2d 828, 829-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
dism'd) (reversed and remanded because trial court had abused its discretion in denying an
increase when there was evidence of change of income for both parties, one up, the other
down, and an increase in child care costs).
210. Matush v. Matush, 601 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
211. Cozby v. Cozby, 597 S.W.2d 808, 809-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
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notice of inflation212 and, when fathers are the managing conservators, are
requiring mothers to contribute support even when their obligation is not
mentioned in the original decree. 2t 3 Because inflation is a material change
of circumstances that is a basis for modification, the court in Bagot v.
Bago1214 allowed an increase in support even though the original decree
mandated a subsequent built-in increase. 215 The court pointed out that
changed circumstances include more than an increase in earning capac-
ity.2 16
When the motion to modify a support decree does not give notice that
the petitioned for increase will start with the date of the motion, a court
should grant an increase only from the date of the hearing forward and not
retroactive to the motion date.217 Of course, circumstances also can
change for the payor, and when his income declines steadily a court has
held that the decree should be modified to decrease support payments de-
spite the presence of savings that could be used to sustain the support
level. 21 8 This decision is questionable, however, in that the decline was
over only a seven-month period, and the child's needs did not change be-
cause of the payor's income loss. 2 19
Unless a parent-child relationship has been established, the courts will
not modify a support agreement. 220 Mala v. Moreno 22 1 raises many ques-
tions concerning the propriety of making settlements that affect the child
without having the child represented. In 1973 the mother had sued for
divorce, alleging a common law marriage and asking for child support for
a child born of the marriage. During a hearing on the merits the parties
agreed that the alleged father would pay child support of $150 per month
until the child reached eighteen years of age. The alleged father, however,
would not admit paternity or the existence of a common law marriage.
The court dismissed the mother's subsequent suit to modify the support
order because the order was not based on a finding of a parent-child rela-
tionship.222 The courts have held, however, that for children born prior to
September 1, 1975, there is a common law right to establish paternity, and
thus, the child in Mata could pursue this remedy and establish a parent-
child relationship to obtain proper support. 223 This course of action would
not be open to a child born after September 1, 1975, and this result adds to
212. Bagot v. Bagot, 602 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
213. Carter v. Hall, 589 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ
dism'd); Bradshaw v. Billups, 587 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, no writ).
214. 602 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
215. Id. at 336.
216. Id
217. Grundy v. Grundy, 589 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
218. Watkins v. Austin, 590 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
219. The problem of considering the total assets of the parents when setting child support
obligations needs to be more carefully scrutinized. See Solender, supra note 63, at 177.
220. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
221. 601 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1980, no writ).
222. Id. at 59; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
223. See notes 37-41 supra and accompanying text.
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the argument that the one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional. 224
IV. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
The Texas Supreme Court, perhaps forecasting a ruling of the United
States Supreme Court, 225 has established in In re G.M 226 that the judg-
ment to terminate involuntarily a person's parental rights must be based
on clear and convincing evidence and not on the Texas Family Code stan-
dard of preponderance of the evidence. 227 The court based its holding on
the rule it had enunciated in State v. Adding/on ,228 which concerned state
proceedings to commit individuals to state mental hospitals for an indefi-
nite period. The court stated that "[tihe right to enjoy a natural family unit
is no less important than the right to liberty which requires at least a clear
and convincing standard of proof to inhibit such liberty through involun-
tary and indefinite confinement in a mental institution. '229 The Texas
Supreme Court also held in Durham v. Barrow230 that after there has been
a proper termination of their rights, the natural parents have no standing
to bring a bill of review in connection with the subsequent adoption. 23' If,
however, the termination is set aside, the parties to the termination may
bring a bill of review against the adoption.232
The Family Code provisions for waiver of citation prior to the filing of a
suit for termination 233 continue to be sustained, 234 and unless the provi-
sions concerning grounds for termination are found to have been violated,
there can be no termination of parental rights.235 In In re S.D.H. 236 the
father's parental rights were held not terminated because he had been im-
prisoned prior to the birth of the child; the court found that he did not
violate the Texas Family Code, for he could not have voluntarily left the
child.237 The Family Code mandates the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent the child when the child is not a petitioner and the other
parties have interests such that they will not represent the child.238 In Sisk
v. Duck,239 a case in which the father and the grandparents were fighting
224. See notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
225. See Doe v. Delaware, 100 S. Ct. 1336, 63 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1980).
226. 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980).
227. Id. at 847; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.15 (Vernon 1975).
228. 588 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1979).
229. 596 S.W.2d at 847.
230. 600 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1980). See also Solender, supra note 50, at 182.
231. 600 S.W.2d at 760.
232. Id
233. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(K) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
234. See In re B.B.F., 595 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ).
235. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
236. 591 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ). See also Allred v. Low-
rey, 597 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1980) (prisoner-father seeking to appeal termination of his paren-
tal rights received writ of mandamus to order authorization of appeal on basis of inability to
pay costs).
237. 591 S.W.2d at 638; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02(I)(A), (B) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
1981).
238. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.10(a) (Vernon 1975).
239. 593 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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over the custody of the child, the court reversed and remanded because no
one acted as guardian ad litem for the child.240 While a guardian ad litem
is important for the representation of the child, his powers are limited, and
it was error for a trial court to direct the guardian ad litem to file suit in
federal court in connection with an alleged violation of the child's civil
rights.2
4 1
The courts often resist terminating parental rights, even if the parent
does not have custody and does not contribute regularly to the child's sup-
port. The managing conservator spouse may have remarried, and the new
spouse may wish to adopt the child; such a situation gives rise to a number
of petitions for intra-familial terminations and adoptions. The spouse who
wishes to arrange for the termination of the other spouse's parental rights
must demonstrate that there has been a failure of support commensurate
with ability to pay during a period of one year ending within six months of
the date of the filing of the petition. 242 The court in Brazier v. Brazier
2 43
determined that the statutory date of the filing of a petition to terminate
parental rights in a case with multiple amended petitions is the date to
which the final petition relates back.244 In Brazier a petition for divorce
was filed, and in the first amended petition a termination of parental rights
was requested. The third amended petition supplanted and superseded all
prior petitions, but it included the request to terminate parental rights and
so it was held to relate back.245 In the case of In re TB. S246 the court
found that the father had paid support up to within eleven months of the
filing of the petition and so reversed and remanded. 247 In Craddock v.
Worley248 the court held that there was no evidence that the father had the
ability to support the child and thus reversed and remanded. 249
In re SR.M 250 involved a third party who wanted to terminate the pa-
rental rights of a divorced mother in order to adopt her child. The appel-
late court agreed with the trial court that there was insufficient evidence to
support the allegations in the pleadings and also held that a termination
based on unpleaded grounds would be a denial of due process. 25' The
court further found that the mother had not failed to support the child in
accordance with her ability, and reversed and rendered judgment.252
When, however, it can be proved that a father has not supported his child
according to his ability and that it would be in the best interests of the
240. Id at 417.
241. Pleasant Hills Children's Home of the Assemblies of God, Inc. v. Nida, 596 S.W.2d
947, 951 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
242. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(i)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
243. 597 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
244. Id at 444.
245. Id
246. 601 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
247. Id. at 542-43.
248. 601 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
249. Id at 447-48.
250. 601 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
251. Id at 769-70.
252. Id at 771.
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child to terminate the father's parental rights, a court will grant the termi-
nation and permit the stepfather to adopt despite the protests of the fa-
ther.25 3 The court in Matthews v. Simmons 254 reversed and remanded
because, as it pointed out, a judgment that both terminated the father's
parental rights and appointed the father possessory conservator was so in-
consistent as to be nullified. 255 This judgment by the trial court represents
an unfortunate commentary on the understanding by trial court judges of
the meaning of a termination of parental rights.256 As thv Texas Supreme
Court said in In re G.M ,257 "[tlermination is a drastic remedy and is of
such weight and gravity that due process requires . . . [justification] by
proof more substantial than a preponderance of the evidence. '25 8 Quoting
the United States Supreme Court, the court further stated: " 'The standard
serves . . . to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate de-
cision.' "259
Intra-family disputes over children give rise to many complications, but
even in this area contempt judgments are void without adequate notice
and a hearing. 260 When the parents of the children are dead and two fami-
lies seek to adopt so as to oust the other from any relationship with the
children, the situation becomes even more complex and may not be resolv-
able. In Remling v. Green26' the basis for the decision was a social study
report that recommended adoption by one set of grandparents. The study
was conducted at the direction of the court in accordance with the stat-
ute262 and was filed with the court on the date of the adoption hearing.
The report was not entered into evidence, and the investigator was not
called to testify. Nevertheless, the trial court considered the social study in
making its determination. The court of civil appeals reversed and re-
manded on the grounds that the social study should not have been used by
the trial court in reaching its decision,263 but the Texas Supreme Court
held that because the statute mandates such a study, and because there was
knowledge of the filing of the study and no objection to it was raised at the
trial, the trial court should have considered it.264 The court pointed out
that to deny the trial court access to a mandated study would subvert the
intent of the statute.265 The issue of court ordered access by persons other
253. Memmer v. Anderson, 593 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
254. 589 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
255. Id at 159.
256. See Solender, supra note 63, at 183.
257. 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1980).
258. Id at 847. See also Barrow v. Durham, 574 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1978), aj'd, 600 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1980); Solender, supra note 50, at 182.
259. 596 S.W.2d at 847 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Addington v. State, 441 U.S. 418
(1979)).
260. Exparte Standard, 596 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
261. 601 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980), rev'd, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
81 (Nov. 19, 1980).
262. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
263. 601 S.W.2d at 87.




than grandparents, such as aunts and uncles, was not addressed. The
supreme court merely reversed the appellate court on the social study is-
sue; other matters were remanded to the trial court.266
The state is often the moving party in suits to terminate parental rights.
The state may intervene in cases of alleged child abuse, but the judgment
must be clear as to the grounds and should not be phrased in the disjunc-
tive.267 If the evidence of danger to the child's emotional well-being is
sufficient, termination of parental rights can also be effected. 268 If the evi-
dence is not sufficiently clear and convincing, however, there can be no
termination. 269 In protecting the children, the state, not being a human
person, places the children in the care of foster parents until the situation
can be clarified. This is often done by an order naming the foster parents
as temporary managing conservators, which is an interlocutory order and
is not appealable. 270 If the foster parents become attached to their charges
and decide to petition to adopt, they have standing to do so. 27I
The Texas Supreme Court in In re TE T 272 has again addressed the
question of the distinction between fathers and mothers in connection with
the right to legitimate their natural children. 273 This is an important issue
because without a legal connection with the child a parent would have no
standing to contest its placement or its adoption.274 Under the Family
Code a child born out of wedlock is legitimate as to its mother,275 but the
natural father must take affirmative action before the child can be legiti-
mate as to him.276 One of the requirements for voluntary legitimation is
the consent of the mother or the managing conservator, 277 or a court find-
ing that it is in the best interests of the child that he be legitimated despite
the mother's or managing conservator's failure to consent.278 This distinc-
266. Id.
267. W.H. v. Moore, 589 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ); see
W.H. v. Moore, 591 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ) (held, after remand,
that the grounds alleged were sufficient for termination). See also Matthews v. Simmons,
589 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
268. See Melton v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 602 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); In re Sneed, 592 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1979, no writ).
269. See In re Hare, 599 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ); Chesser
v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 595 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
no writ).
270. In re T.R., 596 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
271. Harris County Child Welfare Unit v. Caloudas, 590 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
272. 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1980).
273. This issue was first addressed in In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1010 (1976).
274. See In re C.D.V., 589 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ), in
which the court granted an adoption after denying the biological father's petition for volun-
tary legitimation. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the father, and the
appellate court pointed out that this was superfluous because there were no rights to termi-
nate. Id at 547.
275. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.01 (Vernon 1975).
276. Id. § 12.02(c).
277. Id. § 13.21(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
278. Id § 13.21(c).
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tion between the sexes has led to the belief, by some, that the present Fam-
ily Code provisions are unconstitutional. The Texas Supreme Court
reviewed all the recent United States Supreme Court decisions on the sub-
ject 279 and distinguished them on the basis that the fact situations in those
cases involved fathers with long-term relationships with their children,
whereas in the case before it, the father had never had possession of the
child. 280 The Texas Supreme Court then held that the Texas statute does
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 28'
Three justices dissented,282 based on the claim that there was a misreading
of the Supreme Court opinions by the majority and further that the court
had not considered the effect of the Texas equal rights amendment on a
gender-based distinction. 283
279. Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978).
280. 603 S.W.2d at 797-98.
281. Id at 798.
282. Id.
283. Id at 801; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a, which provides: "Equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This
amendment is self-operative."
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